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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Principals

SUBJECT: NIO Concept

REFERENCE: Memorandum to USIB Principals, same subject, distributed
at 2 August 1973 USIB meeting

In both oral and written comments on the NIO concept, several USIB members and other interested parties have expressed concern over the relationship of the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) and the USIB. As I remarked at the USIB meeting of 9 August, the relationship between the NIOs and USIB is understood as a matter which must be eventually addressed; however, I intend to keep options open at this time. Several of the USIB members were briefed informally on a previous concept for restructuring of the USIB committee system. That Intelligence Community Staff proposal addressed a problem apart from the NIO concept and envisaged quite a different function for DCI representatives in the USIB structure. However, the NIO concept essentially subsumes some of the proposals of the USIB committee restructure proposal and voids key elements of that proposal. The IC Staff has reviewed its proposals in the light of the NIO concept and prepared a new proposal which is outlined on the attached "An Approach to NIO/USIB Interface." This presents one, but by no means the only, option open for correlating the functions of USIB with those of the NIOs. I forward it as a possible basis for focusing discussion at USIB on the NIO matter.

W. E. Colby
Acting Director

Attachment

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AN APPROACH TO NIO/USIB INTERFACE

1. The following concept for melding NIOs and related USIB functions is based on the following guidelines:

-- Command lines of CIA and of the USIB Principals shall not be violated.

-- Permanent staffs of the NIOs shall be minimal.

-- Total numbers of USIB entities shall be held to the minimum essential.

-- No functioning element of the community will be in a position to evaluate its own contribution to national intelligence.

-- Useful aspects of current USIB committee structure will be preserved.

-- Collegial nature of USIB responses to national intelligence requirements will be retained.

2. This concept visualizes the elements supporting USIB organized into nine primary substantive committees--six geographical, two topical (Strategic Weapons/SALT and General Purpose Forces/MBFR), and one functional (Security). These primary committees will be chaired by NIOs as described in Mr. Colby's memorandum. The standing members of the committee will be representatives of those USIB members as appropriate to the substantive area covered by the committee with additional ad hoc members appropriate to matters under consideration. These primary committees will be backed up by support groups representing basic collection systems (PHOTINT, SIGINT, HUMINT) as well as across-the-geographical-board disciplines (economics and S&T).

3. Primary Committees. Eight committees will be formed to correspond to the NIOs proposed with the NIO as chairman. Standing members of the geographical committees will be the NIO plus representatives of CIA, DIA and INR. Standing members of the Strategic Weapons and General Purpose Forces committees will include the NIO, CIA, DIA, INR, AEC and NSA. The ninth committee will be a Security Committee with expanded duties in foreign release and compartmentation problems of USIB. It would also be chaired by an NIO with standing membership from CIA, DIA, INR, NSA, FBI and AEC. Ad hoc members will be added at the discretion of the NIO or upon request of USIB members according to subject matter under consideration.

4. USIB Support Groups. The functions of the current collection system-oriented USIB committees (COMIREX, SIGINT and Human Sources Committee) will be retained. They will, however, become support groups. They will assist the geographic committees with advice on collection systems, particularly in the area of formulation of collection strategies against key information gaps. They will also perform their current function of consolidation of requirements and priorities by collection system and will advise the Security Committee on matters pertaining to security problems in their area of expertise. A fourth collection group could be formed to provide advice on other [redacted] collection, such as RADINT, [redacted]. The IREX Support Group would perform essentially the same functions as COMIREX; the SIGINT Support Group, the functions of the SIGINT Committee; and the Human Sources Support Group would subsume the functions of IPC and the IDC as subelements of the Human Resources Collection System management function. If a [redacted] Support Group is formed, it could perform similar functions in that area of collection management.

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5. The present GMAIC, JAEIC and SIC functions would fall under the supervision of an additional support group--the Foreign S&T Support Group. These entities could remain distinct or their functions could be merged. This support group would respond to the needs of the Strategic Weapons/SALT NIO but would have support functions to other NIOs as well. If the name or nature of the JAEIC is altered a minor change to an NSCID would be required.

6. The USIB responsibility for economic intelligence can be handled either through the creation of a tenth primary committee as outlined in Paragraph 3, or as an Economic Intelligence Support Group. The latter is probably preferable in that the separation of economic intelligence from general intelligence on geographical areas is more the exception than the rule.

7. There are two options for chairing the support groups. The chairman can be selected in the manner of the NIOs and they can serve as "sole duty" DCI representatives, or the chairman of these groups can be selected from the operating offices of the community agencies. In the latter case, the IREX Support Group could be administered and operated by DDI/CIA, the SIGINT Support Group by NSA, the Human Sources Support Group by DDO/CIA, the [redacted] Support Group by DC/DIA, the Foreign S&T Support Group by DDS&T/CIA or DT/DIA, and the Economic Intelligence Support Group by OER/CIA.

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8. The above actions or options can be adopted without specific immediate disposition of the current USIB committees. If the general concept is adopted, the disposition of the committees can be later worked out in detail to retain useful features of the current structure. Some of the possibilities are as follows:

a. Watch Committee: For the time being this committee should be retained. However, its eventual disposition will depend upon the results of ongoing efforts to upgrade warning and crisis reporting systems at the national level.

b. NIS Committee. In the light of recent disestablishment of the NIS program, this committee can be terminated.

c. Intelligence Information Handling Committee. The functions of this committee require such close coordination with the Intelligence Community Staff that its function should be transferred to that staff. However, USIB member representation in this community effort should continue.

d. Critical Collection Problems Committee. The primary NIO/USIB committees will be examining collection problems in their areas of responsibility on a day-to-day basis and, therefore, there may be no further need for a CCPC.

e. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee. Since this is essentially a specialized aspect of USIB security functions, an expanded Security Committee should absorb its activities.

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SUMMARY OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR/CIA AND USIB MEMBER COMMENTS ON NIO/USIB INTERFACE

DDI Comments:

1. Primary argument is for delay in fusing NIO and USIB committee structure.

Answer: There will inevitably be considerable delay in any case as the important matter of selecting the NIOs will take some time. The need to clarify the relationships of the NIOs to USIB, however, is immediate. Dr. Cline has already broached the subject at USIB.

There will be considerable worry among USIB members about being "cut out of the pattern" by NIOs. Put bluntly, there is even now concern in DIA that the NIOs will comprise a group of "George Carvers" who can operate independently of USIB advice.

A third point which argues against delay relates to staff requirements of the NIOs. If the NIO does not have a mechanism through which we can levy support requirements (drafting, reproduction, staff action, coordination, security control, etc.) on the community, he will either require considerable staff of his own or he will place all his demands on CIA line directorates. The first option is undesirable because it sets up more "offices"; the second is undesirable because it cuts across command lines and removes any vestige of community participation below USIB itself.

2. DDI sees NIO/USIB committee meld as laying resource management responsibilities on the NIO.

Answer: As we envisage it, the USIB committee chaired by the NIO would evaluate, but not manage, the application of existing USIB resources against substantive requirements. The NIOs would be called upon to coordinate the marshaling of community resources to meet the demands of NSC in impending or actual crisis situations in their subject areas. Resource management in its broader sense would remain a matter for IRAC with IC Staff support.

3. DDI sees the phrase "overseeing coordination" in the draft as needing clarification.

Answer: We agree. What we intended to convey was a situation in which the NIO gave one USIB agency the responsibility for drafting and coordinating a community substantive paper. His role would be to supervise the initial effort, not to do the coordinating himself. However, we would see the NIO chairing coordination sessions prior to presentation of a paper to the DCI and USIB.

4. DDI raises the question of whether economics intelligence should be handled in the NIO/USIB committee or in the Support Group concept. DDI favors the latter.

Answer: We agree. Economic intelligence essentially supports geographic committee efforts. Further, the Support Group can be headed up by operating chiefs (such as Dr. Ernst). In the case of economics intelligence, this looks to be more efficient than appointment of an NIO. However, where DDI expresses concern that other Support Groups, such as Human Sources and SIGINT, may be headed up by operating chiefs (from DDO or NSA) we think the same reasoning applies--that is, it appears more efficient to have operating elements of the community chair and administer these groups.

DDS&T Comments:

1. DDS&T recommends that certain NIOs wear two hats, that is, that some should not be full-time NIOs.

Answer: In our view, the NIOs would be unable to perform other than NIO duties because of work load. Further, both the fact and the appearance of NIO disassociation from bureaucratic pressures within the community are essential to making the NIO system work.

2. DDS&T argues for Mr. Helms' system of having USIB committee chairmen report to the CIA deputies.

Answer: There have always been two options for DCI leadership in the community--one is to use his CIA deputies and the other is to set up a separate community-oriented apparatus. DDS&T is arguing for the first option. With regard to the specific case of the technical committees (GMAIC, JAEIC, SIC), we are in fact leaving open the option to put the responsibility for their functions on DDS&T. The only difference from DDS&T's concept would be that those committee functions would fall under the Foreign S&T Support Group. This group would perform a service of common concern for the various NIOs in the technical field. If the DCI so elects, it can be chaired and administered by DDS&T.

3. DDS&T perceives the amalgamation of certain USIB committees into a single committee or support group as based solely on the need to reduce numbers of committees.

Answer: The consolidations recommended are in part based on a desire to reduce the proliferation of USIB committees and subcommittees. However,

they were also based on a perceived need to reduce the number of issues addressed in a fractionated rather than synthesized manner.

DDO Comments:

1. DDO expresses concern that the NIOs--with or without a USIB committee function--will tend to cut across line elements of CIA in their activities, but that with a USIB function this problem increases.

Answer: DDO points up most sharply a concern of CIA Deputy Directors and USIB members. There is a possibility that a vigorous (or tactless) NIO would operate without due regard for institutional fabric. However, we believe that the USIB linkage will ameliorate, not increase, this danger. With a USIB committee, the NIO will have a precise point of contact for each agency in all actions, who is accountable to his parent agency. The CIA member, for instance, would be responsible for keeping actions properly within CIA command channels. The biggest danger would be in an NIO who, lacking USIB member support, developed a sizable independent staff to handle user requests.

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[redacted] tentatively) and expresses worries about the use of "normal command channels" and the restructuring of USIB committees as previously briefed to him.

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[redacted] concerns with the first USIB committee restructuring concept were twofold. First, he thought that S&T matters were being downgraded and/or winding up too much in the hands of DDS&T. Also, he viewed the possibility of the SIGINT committee function being dominated by NSA as a threat to DIA's ability to task NSA. It is likely that he would be less concerned about S&T with Strategic Weapons/SALT and General Purpose Forces/MBFR elevated to the same level as the geographic committees, although he would resist DDS&T Support Group. He would probably prefer an independent chairman. He would probably also urge that the chairman of the SIGINT Support Group be a DCI, rather than NSA, man.

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[redacted] (in his paragraph 4) wrestles rather vaguely with the problem of NIO/USIB interface, especially with regard to the evaluation function. He suggests an expansion of the CCPC charter to cover evaluation and coordination functions we have recommended for the geographic committees.

Answer: This suggests to us that [redacted] realizes there must be some mechanism to interface the NIOs and USIB, but he remains undecided as to how.

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Army Comments on NIOs:

Army raises the question of interface with USIB committees and asks for a sharper definition of such terms as "panel of experts" and "national intelligence."

Air Force Comments on NIOs:

Air Force specifically recommends USIB committees for the NIOs and a community staff in support.

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DCI/IC 73-0855/A

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DD/M&S 73-3185

17 AUG 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy to the DCI for the IC

SUBJECT : USIB Committee Structure

REFERENCE : Memo dtd 7 Aug 73 to DCI fr D/DCI/IC,
subj: NIO/USIB Interface

1. Although we do not pretend to understand precisely how the complete NIO/USIB concept would work in practice, we do applaud the effort to integrate functions and to encourage better Intelligence Community participation. The attached specific comments about the proposed Security Committee have been prepared by the Director of Security, who is also Chairman, USIB Security Committee. I concur with his recommendations.

2. I am concerned, however, with the management problems implicit in referent memorandum and in the NIO paper discussed at the 12 July 1973 meeting of the Management Committee. While it seems that each NIO (also Chairman of a USIB Committee) must be a substantive expert, he apparently also will be expected to exercise considerable managerial expertise. For example, he must coordinate the efforts of specialists representing IC members, program production requirements, supervise the administrative or clerical inputs, be prepared to brief the Director on short notice and handle many other routine jobs--all without the aid of assistants. In other words, we are proposing that each NIO be given rare and important responsibilities, but seemingly we are not providing him with the wherewithal he needs to do the job. I believe this matter merits additional examination.

3. I would suggest further that a position such as Director of USIB Committees or Coordinator of USIB Committees be created to manage, for the DCI, all NIO/USIB Committee matters. This committee director would have supervisory responsibility over the NIO's and the staff supporting them. Such an arrangement need not prevent direct and frequent contact between the NIO and the Director. It could, however, remove much of the managerial burden from the NIO and enable him to concentrate solely on substantive intelligence matters. Also, I do not consider it practical for the Director to provide direct day-to-day supervision to 10 or more NIO/USIB Chairmen, as stated in the basic NIO paper. Adoption of this suggestion or a similar one would overcome that problem.

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4. The most important function of the Committees is stated to be, reporting on "...effectiveness and sufficiency of resources...". This appears to be at best confusing if not in fact in conflict with the responsibilities of the IRAC. Either the function or the language should be revised.

5. Finally, I am interested in the recommended staffing and associated costs for the NIO/USIB Committees and Staff and the impact on the Agency. I will anticipate early discussion of this matter with you and other officials.

6. Assuming that reasonable solutions to the management problems are forthcoming, I endorse the NIO/USIB concept described in referent memorandum.




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HAROLD L. BROWNMEN
Deputy Director
for
Management and Services

Att

cc: D/Security

*Attachments not included due to classification and thickness (Primarily Background matter), however, I will make available to you if desired.



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